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Substantial Connection: The Intersection of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and
Constitutional Protections for Foreign
National Contractors Serving with or
Accompanying U.S. Armed Forces
Joe D. Montenegro*
Abstract
Every day, many foreign nationals place their lives in danger for the
benefit of the United States while serving with U.S. Armed Forces in
hostile environments. In United States v. Ali, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces held that a combat interpreter did not have a
substantial connection, as envisioned under United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, with the United States to entitle the interpreter to Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections. Although the result is likely correct given
that U.S. service members prosecuted under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) are not entitled to the specific protections which
were requested by the interpreter, the Ali decision creates concerns as to
how future courts may apply the substantial connection test.
Given the constraints the substantial connection test imposes within
the military context, the practical emphasis of Boumediene v. Bush, and
the interplay between the sufficient nexus and substantial connection
tests, this Comment argues that military courts should utilize sufficient
nexus factors, in addition to the Boumediene three-part test, when
addressing whether foreign nationals are entitled to constitutional
protections. Adopting this method would ensure that the connection
emphasis of Verdugo-Urquidez is maintained, while also allowing
foreign national contractors tried under the UCMJ to have a meaningful
analysis into the extent of their connection with the United States.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2014. Dedicated to Sergeant First Class Riley G. Stephens, 1st Battalion, 3rd
Special Forces Group (Airborne). Killed In Action, September 28, 2012, Wardak
Province, Afghanistan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two scenarios involving the underlying facts
of United States v. Ali' and United States v. Brehm, respectively.
2
Scenario One: An interpreter with dual Canadian and Iraqi
citizenship is employed for an American company that has a contract to
provide linguistic services for the U.S. military.3 Before beginning his
assignment in Iraq, he travels to Fort Benning, Georgia, to conduct pre-
deployment training and receive military equipment.4 Upon arriving in
Iraq, the interpreter is assigned to live at a combat outpost and is
embedded with a U.S. military squad that conducts training operations
1. United States v. Ali (Ali 11), 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
2. United States v. Brehm (Brehm 11), 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2012).
3. Ali11, 71 M.J. at259.
4. United States v. Ali (Ali]), 70 M.J. 514,516 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2011).
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with the Iraqi police. The interpreter is present alongside U.S. military
forces during missions and initially sleeps in the same quarters as the
military squad.6 By all accounts, the interpreter is an integral and
necessary part of the U.S. military unit.
During the course of his deployment, the interpreter gets into a
physical altercation with another interpreter. 8 After being separated, he
misappropriates a knife from the squad leader and subsequently cuts the
other interpreter. 9 Military officials charge the interpreter under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 10 with wrongful appropriation
of the knife, making a false official statement, and impeding the
subsequent investigation."
Scenario Two: A South African citizen is employed as a travel
supervisor for an American company that has a contract with the
Department of Defense (DOD) to provide support services for U.S.
Armed Forces in Afghanistan. 12 The contractor's specific duties include
making travel arrangements and processing outgoing and incoming
personnel.'" These personnel are not U.S. military personnel, but civilian
contractors. 14 Additionally, the DOD issues an authorization letter that
grants the South African permission to reside on the military base,
receive meals, and access military exchange stores.' 5
One day, the South African attacks and injures a British
contractor. 16 U.S. officials charge the South African under the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) 17 with assault with a dangerous
5. Ali11, 71 M.J. at 259.
6. Id.
7. See Ali I, 70 M.J. at 518 (noting that Ali's "presence as an interpreter was
essential to the ability of the unit to accomplish its primary mission of training and
advising the Iraqi police").
8. Id. at 516.
9. Id.
10. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006 &
Supp. V 2012). The interpreter was charged under the UCMJ because his status as a
host-country national, an Iraqi citizen serving with the U.S. military in Iraq, likely
rendered him ineligible to be charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
of 2000 (MEJA). See Ali1, 70 M.J. at 516 n.4.
11. Ali 1, 70 M.J. at 514. The interpreter was also charged with aggravated assault
with a dangerous weapon, but the charge was later dropped pursuant to a plea agreement.
Id. at 517.
12. United States v. Brehm (Brehm I), No. l:ll-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *2




16. Brehm H1, 691 F.3d 547, 549 (4th Cir. 2012).
17. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67
(2006). The MEJA subjects persons to U.S. jurisdiction who commit an offense that is
punishable by confinement of over a year, while being "employed by or accompanying
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weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily harm.18 After conducting
a telephonic hearing with a U.S. Magistrate Judge, the South African is
transported to Virginia to await trial. 19
Although the two cases involve foreign national contractors who
were serving with or accompanying U.S. Armed Forces, the outcomes of
the seemingly similar cases were decidedly different. Under Scenario
One, the Ali court held that the interpreter's connections to the United
States were not substantial enough to entitle the interpreter to Fifth and
Sixth Amendment 20 due process protections.21 Under Scenario Two, the
Brehm court held that the South African's connections to the United
States were significant enough to establish a "suitable proxy for due
process purposes. 22
Given the fact that Ali was charged under the UCMJ 23 and Brehm
was charged under the MEJA,24 there remains some discussion about
whether the cases create a circuit split.25  Instead of focusing on the
the [U.S.] Armed Forces outside the United States." Id. § 3261(a)(1). The purpose of the
MEJA was to help fill the "jurisdictional gap" under which overseas crimes committed
by persons supporting U.S. Armed Forces went unpunished due to lack of jurisdiction.
See K. Elizabeth Waits, Note, Avoiding the "Legal Bermuda Triangle": The Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act's Unprecedented Expansion of U.S. Criminal
Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 493, 516-19 (2006)
(discussing the scope by which the MEJA closes the jurisdictional gap).
18. Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 549.
19. Id.
20. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
21. Ali 11, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012). The specific constitutional protections
sought by Ali consisted of a grand jury indictment, an independent judge, and trial by
jury. Id. at 276. Unlike trial under the UCMJ, these types of protections are commonly
afforded to persons tried under the MEJA. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 654 F.3d
637, 641, 645 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that a civilian defendant who was tried under the
MEJA was indicted by a grand jury and convicted at trial by a jury).
22. Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 553.
23. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006 &
Supp. V 2012). Ali was ineligible to be tried under the MEJA because of his status as a
host-country national. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(C) (2006). The author uses the term
"host-country national" to refer to a foreign national military contractor who is a citizen
of the nation in which she is working.
24. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) of 2000, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67
(2006). Brehm was not a host-country national because he was a South African citizen
supporting U.S. Armed Forces while he was in Afghanistan. Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 549.
Thus, he was not exempt from prosecution under the MEJA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(C)
(2006).
25. Compare Jeremy W. Steward, MEJA Update-United States v. Brehm, 31(B)LOG
(Aug. 15, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://bit.ly/QjLWgK (remarking that the difference in
underlying statutes may allow for the difference in due process protections between Ali
and Brehm), with Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Ali 1I, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012)
(No. 12-805), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (2013) (arguing that the Brehm and Ali
decisions create a circuit split), and Steve Viadeck, Brehm: Fourth Circuit Creates Split
in Contractor-Contacts Analysis, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 12, 2012, 7:00 PM),
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possibility of a circuit split, however, this Comment will utilize the
practical connection analysis of Brehm26 to highlight the concerns
stemming from the Ali decision.27
Specifically, this Comment will analyze the Ali court's application
of the substantial connection test formulated by the plurality in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.28 The substantial connection test requires
that foreign nationals come within the territorial confines of the United
States and voluntarily establish a substantial connection with the United
States to receive constitutional protections.29 In light of the court's
substantial connection application, the defendant in Ali was found to
have no Fifth or Sixth Amendment constitutional protections, 30 despite
the seemingly more substantial connections present in Ali than in
Brehm.31
This Comment will argue that, as applied to foreign nationals who
serve with or accompany U.S. Armed Forces, the Ali decision is
problematic in two ways. First, it may unnecessarily prevent future
foreign national defendants from asserting Fifth and Sixth Amendment
claims that are unaffected by a military trial.32 Second, the use of the
substantial connection test within the military context prevents any
meaningful consideration of a foreign national's connection with the
United States.33
Part II of this Comment will address the sufficient nexus test34 used
by some circuit courts in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
over the defendant satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.35 Part II will also discuss cases addressing the applicability
http://bit.ly/NsbbMM (arguing that a split is created despite the difference in underlying
statutes).
26. Brehm H,691 F.3d at 553.
27. Alil, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
28. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
29. Id. at 271 (plurality opinion) (establishing that "aliens receive constitutional
protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country").
30. See Ali H, 71 M.J. at 268 (noting the "whatever rights (Ali] had were met
through the [UCMJ]").
31. Compare Ali 11, 71 M.J. at 259 (discussing interpreter's pre-deployment training,
clothing, living arrangements, and significance of his job), with Brehm 1, No. 1: 11-CR-
11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (discussing contractor's job as a
travel supervisor who processed incoming and outgoing company employees).
32. See infra Part III.B.1.
33. See infra Part III.B.2.
34. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In order to
apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due
process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United
States ... ").
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of other constitutional protections to foreign nationals. Part III will
analyze the connection analyses in Brehm and Ali, and suggest that
military courts consider sufficient nexus factors, in addition to the three-
part test in Boumediene v. Bush,36 when addressing whether foreign
nationals are entitled to constitutional protections.
In light of the employment realities of many foreign nationals who
serve with or accompany U.S. Armed Forces,37 a framework that applies
nexus factors, in addition to the Boumediene three-part test,38 is needed
to ensure that these workers are given meaningful consideration of their
connection with the United States.39
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS
FRAMEWORKS
A. Sufficient Nexus Test
Circuit courts have developed differentn° tests to ensure that the
application of an extraterritorial statute over a foreign national defendant
does not "violate the due process clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment. 'A1
One such test, adopted by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, 42 is known as the "sufficient nexus" test.
43
1. Sufficient Nexus Rationale
A key sufficient nexus case is United States v. Davis.an In Davis,
the U.S. Coast Guard was suspicious that a British marked boat on a
watch list was smuggling drugs.45  After receiving permission from
36. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
37. See infra Part III.B.2.
38. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (establishing a three-part factor test).
39. See infra Part III.D.
40. See Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in US. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
323, 348-72 (2012) (describing the development of the nexus- and fairness-based tests).
Although the nexus- and fairness-based tests are commonly thought of as being different,
one court has remarked that the distinction between the two is not significant. See United
States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2003) (noting that the
"difference [between the nexus and fairness tests] is less real than apparent; the existence
of a nexus is what makes the prosecution neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair").
41. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. See United States v. Mohanmmad-Omar, 323 F. App'x 259, 261-62 (4th Cir.
2009); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1987).
43. See Stigall, supra note 40, at 348-57 (discussing the development of the
sufficient nexus test).
44. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
45. Id. at 247.
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British officials to enter the boat, Coast Guard personnel boarded the
boat and found over 7,000 pounds of marijuana.46 The boat captain, a
British citizen, was charged and convicted under the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA)47 with intent to distribute the drugs.48
On appeal, the boat captain argued that the MDLEA did not apply
to "persons on foreign vessels outside the territory of the United
States."49 The court disagreed. 50 First, the court found that Congress had
constitutional authority to make the MDLEA apply extraterritorially.5"
Next, the court addressed the question of whether applying the MDLEA
to the defendant's specific acts would violate due process concerns."
The court rationalized that "there must be a sufficient nexus between the
defendant and the United States, . . . so that such application [of the
extraterritorial statute] would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.
5 3
Applying the sufficient nexus test, the Davis court found that a sufficient
nexus existed because the defendant's goal of smuggling drugs into the
country was for the purpose of enabling illegal actions within the United
States.5
In other words, the sufficient nexus referred to was the connection
between the United States and the individual defendant. 5  By analyzing
whether a defendant's connection with the United States is sufficient for
due process purposes, courts have a tool to ensure that, as applied to the
specific defendant, the application of the statute is not simply random or
unjust." By preventing such an application, the Fifth Amendment 57 due
process concern is thereby satisfied.
5 8
Although Davis emphasized the scope of a defendant's connection
with the United States from the perspective of intended effects,
46. Id.
47. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1901-04 (Supp. IV
1986) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-08 (2006 & Supp. IV 2008)).
48. Davis, 905 F.2d at 247.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 248.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49.
54. Id. at 249.
55. Id. at 248-49 (remarking "there must be a sufficient nexus between the
defendant and the United States").
56. Id. at 249 n.2 (describing the ultimate question as being whether "application of
the statute to the defendant [would] be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair").
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 (stating "a sufficient nexus exists so that the application
of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act to Davis' extraterritorial conduct does not
violate the due process clause").
2013]
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subsequent courts applying the sufficient nexus test have expanded upon
the scope of factors considered.59
2. Expansion of the Sufficient Nexus Test
Whether the subject matter at issue impacts significant American
interests is also a factor considered under the sufficient nexus test.6° In
United States v. Shahani-Jahromi,61 the court applied the sufficient nexus
test in addressing whether the application of an extraterritorial statute
violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights.62 The
defendant was charged with violating the International Parenting
Kidnapping Crime Act63 for keeping his daughter in Iran for the purpose
of thwarting the mother's custody rights.64 Applying the sufficient nexus
test, the court found a sufficient nexus existed because "the United States
manifestly [had] a clear interest in ensuring that parental rights are
respected, especially when the marital domicile of the parents [was]
within the United States. 65  Similarly, employment is also a relevant
factor in applying the sufficient nexus test.
66
In United States v. Ayesh,67 the court found employment to be a
suitable basis for establishing a sufficient nexus. 68  Ayesh was a
Jordanian resident who was working in Iraq as a shipping and customs
manager for the U.S. Department of State. 69 Ayesh was charged with
abusing his position to steal money. 70 Although neither party raised the
sufficient nexus concern, the court nonetheless considered the issue.7 1
Analogizing the sufficient nexus test to the minimum contacts test, 72 the
court found a sufficient nexus existed because the defendant's
59. See Brehm 1, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30,
2011) (discussing other nexus factors considered by courts to include "(1) the defendant's
actual contacts with the United States, including [one's] citizenship or residency; (2) the
location of the acts allegedly giving rise to the alleged offense; . . .(4) the impact on
significant United States interests" and employment).
60. Id.
61. United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
62. Id. at 725.
63. International Parenting Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (Supp. V 1993)
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006)).
64. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
65. Id. at 728.
66. See United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 842 (E.D. Va. 2011).
67. United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 832 (E.D. Va. 2011).
68. See id. at 842.
69. Id. at 834.
70. Id. at 833.
71. Id. at 842.
72. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating "to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam" due process requires that a defendant "have certain
minimum contacts" with the forum state).
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employment with the United States "was central to the commission of his
alleged crimes. 73
The sufficient nexus test serves as a device for courts to ensure that
Fifth Amendment due process protection is satisfied by ensuring that
extraterritorial statutes are not haphazardly applied to foreign national
defendants.74 Although not identical, other constitutional protections
concern similar sufficient nexus traits such as extraterritoriality,
practicality, and the scope of the connection between the United States
and the foreign national.75
B. Constitutional Protections
Courts have also addressed the similar, but separate issue of
whether foreign nationals are entitled to non-jurisdictional constitutional
protections.76 Similar to the connection concern with extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the underlying analysis also centers on the scope of the
foreign national's connection with the United States.77
1. Emphasis on Formalism
Johnson v. Eisentrager78 involved the issue of whether German
enemy prisoners, who were convicted by a military commission, were
entitled to writs of habeas corpus.7 9 The Court found that the defendants
were not entitled to the writs, 80 holding that "the Constitution does not
confer a right of personal security ... from military trial and punishment
upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at
war with the United States. 81
73. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
74. See United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990).
75. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) ("[T]he idea [is] that
questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism."); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S 259, 271 (1990) (establishing
that aliens receive constitutional rights when they voluntarily establish a significant
connection with the United States).
76. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261 (considering "whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country"); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649
F.3d 762, 769-72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (addressing whether detainees held in Iraq and
Afghanistan could assert due process and cruel punishment claims under the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments).
77. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012)
(applying the substantial connection test to determine whether an alien was entitled to
assert First and Fifth Amendment claims).
78. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
79. Id. at 765-66.
80. Id. at 785.
81. Id.
2013]
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In its analysis, the Court focused on a formalistic actual presence
test that addressed whether the enemy aliens were "within [United
States] territorial jurisdiction., 82 This rationale equates actual presence
with affording constitutional protections.83 Because the enemy aliens in
Eisentrager were never present within the territorial confines of the
United States, the Court concluded that the enemy aliens were not
entitled to writs of habeas corpus.
84
2. Extending the Formalistic Focus
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez involved a Mexican drug leader
who was extradited to the United States after being arrested in Mexico by
Mexican police.85 While the drug dealer was incarcerated in a U.S. jail,
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents received approval from
Mexican officials to search his Mexican residences. 86 Verdugo-Urquidez
moved to suppress the evidence found at the residences on the basis that
the Fourth Amendment87 applied to the DEA agents' searches.
88
In its plurality opinion, the Court disagreed and held that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply "to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property that [was] owned by a nonresident alien and located in
a foreign country."89  Similar to Eisentrager, the Court's rationale
emphasized a territorial analysis, stating "aliens receive constitutional
protections when they have come within the territory of the United States
and developed substantial connections with this country." 90
In developing this substantial connection test, the plurality
synthesized case law involving multiple constitutional amendments. 91
Indeed, despite its Fourth Amendment-specific holding, the substantial
connection test has been applied to cases addressing the applicability of
other constitutional protections to foreign nationals as well.92
82. Id. at 771.
83. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78 (noting that "permitting [the aliens'] presence in
the [U.S.] implied protection").
84. Id. at 785.
85. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990).
86. Id
87. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
88. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263.
89. Id. at 261 (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 271.
91. See id. (addressing prior cases involving the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
92. See Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012)
(applying the substantial connection test to determine whether an alien was entitled to
First and Fifth Amendment protections); Al II, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012)
(applying the substantial connection test to determine whether foreign national contractor
was entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections).
[Vol. 118:1
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3. A Shift Toward a Practical Analysis
Boumediene addressed, among other things, the question of whether
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were entitled to writs of habeas
corpus.93 In arguing that the Suspension Clause94 had no application to
the detainees, the U.S. government looked to Eisentrager for the
proposition that technical, or de jure, sovereignty, 95 was the relevant
consideration.96 As Cuba maintained legal sovereignty over the base, the
detainees were not present within the United States and were therefore
not entitled to the writs of habeas corpus.97
The Court, however, rejected the argument that Eisentrager
represented the notion that territorial analysis was the sole factor to
consider with issues of extraterritoriality.98 Instead, the Court noted that
"questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical
concerns, not formalism." 99  Irrespective of the technical question of
whether Guantanamo was within the formal territory of the United
States, the Court applied a functional analysis to determine that the
United States exercised practical, or de facto sovereignty,100 over the
base. 10
To aid this analysis, the Court identified three factors to consider in
determining whether the Suspension Clause applied to detainees.' 02 The
relevant factors are:
93. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The Suspension Clause prohibits suspending the
writ of habeas corpus, except "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [where] the public
Safety may require it." Id.
95. See Anthony J. Colangelo, "De Facto Sovereignty": Boumediene and Beyond,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 623, 626 (2009) ("'[D]e jure sovereignty' means 'formal' or
'technical' sovereignty in the sense of formal recognition of sovereignty by the
government vis-A-vis other governments.").
96. Brief for Respondents, at 19-20, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196), 2007 WL 2972541, at *19-20 ("'[A]t no relevant time' were
the petitioners 'within any territory over which the United States is sovereign."' (quoting
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950))).
97. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753 ("[T]he Government says the Suspension Clause
affords petitioners no rights because the United States does not claim sovereignty over
the place of detention.").
98. Id. at 764 ("Nothing in Eisentrager says that dejure sovereignty is or has ever
been the only relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the
Constitution or of habeas corpus.").
99. Id.
100. See Colangelo, supra note 95, at 626 (arguing that "'de facto sovereignty' means
both practical control and jurisdiction over a territory, such that the de facto sovereign's
laws and legal system govern the territory").
101. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 (noting that the United States "maintains defacto
sovereignty over [the base]").
102. See id. at 766. It should be noted, however, that the factors are not exhaustive,
but merely the minimum factors that must be considered. See id. (stating that "at least
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(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place;
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's
entitlement to the writ. 
103
Applying the three-factor test, the Court found that the first factor
weighed in favor of the defendants in light of their contentious status as
enemy combatants and the lack of procedural protections that they were
afforded. 1°4 Addressing the second factor, the Court also found in favor
of the defendants. 1 5  While recognizing that detention outside the
technical territory of the United States usually weighs against defendants,
the Court once again looked beyond a formalistic analysis and
distinguished Guantanamo on the basis of its perpetual nature. 106 As to
the last factor, the Court also found in favor of the defendants. 10 7 The
Court focused on the non-hostile environment of Guantanamo and the
lack of conflict that would arise with the host nation if the writ were
issued. 10 8  Finding that all three factors weighed in favor of the
defendants, the Court held that the Suspension Clause "ha[d] full effect
at Guantanamo Bay."'10 9
Although Boumediene repudiated a solely formalistic application of
Eisentrager,10 concerns still remain as to Boumediene's coexistence
with Verdugo-Urquidez."' To this end, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has recently applied both Verdugo-Urquidez and
Boumediene in addressing the applicability of constitutional protections
for foreign nationals."
12
three factors are relevant") (emphasis added); see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84,
98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing that manipulation of the detention site by government
officials, by strategically choosing a detainee's detention site, may be an additional factor
to consider under Boumediene).
103. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
104. Id. at 767.
105. Id. at 768.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 769.
108. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769-70. Although the Court found in favor of the
detainees as to the third factor, the Court did remark that "if the detention facility were
located in an active theater of war," the practicality argument might have gone against the
defendants. Id. at 770.
109. Id. at 771.
110. See id. at 762-64 (rejecting the argument that Eisentrager stood for the idea that
defacto sovereignty is the sole consideration in issues of extraterritoriality).
I 11. See infra Part 11I.B.2.
112. See Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012)
(applying the substantial connection test and the Boumediene functional approach).
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4. Combining Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene
In Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, 1 3 the court
considered the issue of whether a foreign national on a student visa, who
left the United States to present her academic research at a conference in
Malaysia, could assert First and Fifth Amendment" 14 claims." 5
The foreign national, a doctoral student at Stanford University, was
mistakenly placed on the "'No-Fly List' and other terrorist watchlists."
'' 16
Prior to leaving for Malaysia, the student had resided in the United States
for four years. 17 Upon attempting to return to the United States, the
student was prevented from returning due to her placement on the watch
lists.",1
The student argued that her mistaken placement on the watch lists
violated her First and Fifth Amendment rights." 9 Utilizing Verdugo-
Urquidez, the U.S. government put forth a territorial-centric argument
that the student's voluntary exit from the United States thereby forfeited
her right to assert any constitutional claims. 20
The court rejected this argument and stated that "the law that we are
bound to follow is, instead, the 'functional approach' of Boumediene and
the 'significant voluntary connection' test of Verdugo-Urquidez."'121 In
light of the student's four years spent at Stanford, along with her purpose
to further her relationship with the United States via the Malaysian
conference, the court held that the student had a "'significant voluntary
connection' with the United States" and was therefore able to assert her
constitutional claims. 1
22
Although these decisions initially focused heavily on physical
presence with regard to issues of extraterritoriality, 123 the post-
Boumediene and Davis era of cases indicate a shift toward a more
practical analysis.
24
113. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
114. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V.
115. Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 987, 994.
116. Id. at986.
117. Id. at 997.
118. Id. at 986.
119. Id. at 994. Specifically, the student claimed that the placements violated her
freedom of association, equal protection, and due process rights. Id.
120. Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 996.
121. Id.at997.
122. Id.
123. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) ("[A]liens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United
States."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (noting that "permitting [the
aliens'] presence in the [U.S.] implied protection").
124. See Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 997 (disregarding the government's argument by which
"any alien, no matter how great her voluntary connection with the United States,
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III. EXTENDING THE NEXUS AND BOUMEDIENE FRAMEWORKS
The type of functional approach applied in Brehm stands in stark
contrast to the formalistic approach applied by the Ali court. 25 In light
of the similar concerns raised by jurisdictional and other constitutional
protections,126 as well as the modem day hiring practices of many foreign
national military contractors, 127 courts should consider sufficient nexus
factors, in addition to the three Boumediene factors, when determining
the applicability of constitutional protections for foreign national military
contractors prosecuted under the UCMj.1
28
A. Connection Analyses of Brehm and Ali
1. Practical Connection Analysis-Brehm
In applying a sufficient nexus test analysis, the Brehm court focused
on the extent to which significant American interests were impacted by
Brehm's actions.1 29  Specifically, the court noted concern for law and
order, military discipline, the use of military resources for Brehm's
confinement, and the DOD authorization letter given to Brehm.13 0
Similar to the de facto approach taken in Boumediene,13 1 the Brehm
court looked beyond the fact that the military base was "not technically
[within the] territory of the United States.' ' 132 Instead, the court viewed
the case with regard to the practical considerations on the ground.
133
immediately loses all constitutional rights as soon as she voluntarily leaves the country");
Brehm 11, 691 F.3d 547, 552-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (disregarding a formalistic analysis in
place of a nexus analysis that focused on the extent to which "significant American
interests" were affected).
125. Compare Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 552-53 (focusing on the extent to which
"significant American interests" were affected despite the fact that the military base was
not within the territorial confines of the United States), with Ali 11, 71 M.J. 256, 268
(C.A.A.F. 2012) ("[W]e are unwilling to extend constitutional protections granted by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a noncitizen who is [not] present within the sovereign
territory of the United States ... ").
126. Compare United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the connection (i.e., the sufficient nexus) between the defendant and the
United States), with Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S at 271-72 (focusing on whether the
defendant voluntarily established a substantial connection with the United States).
127. See infra Part III.B.2.
128. See infra Part III.D.
129. Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 552-53 (noting that the contractor's "actions affected
significant American interests at" the military base).
130. Id.
131. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008) (noting that the United
States maintained "de facto sovereignty over [the] territory").
132. Brehm 11,691 F.3d at 553.




Conversely, had the court applied a formalistic framework, it seems less
likely that the court would have been able to justify that a sufficient
nexus existed.1 14 In contrast to Brehm, the Ali court was much more
reluctant to look past territorial formalities.'35
2. Formalistic Connection Analysis-Ali
Unlike in Brehm, the Ali court adhered to a very formalistic analysis
in addressing the defendant's connection to the United States.'
36
Utilizing Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez for guidance, 137 the court
stressed the territorial aspects of Ali's case.
138
The court primarily emphasized duration and physical location.
139
While the court acknowledged Ali's trip to Fort Benning, the court noted
that his stay was "brief.' 40  This description, along with the court's
formalistic emphasis on territorial concerns,14' leads to the inference that
the court viewed the substantial connection test as requiring foreign
nationals to establish their connection with the United States while
within the United States.
142
This is not to say that the majority's application of the substantial
connection test to the facts of Ali is flawed, 143 but rather that the
territorial constraint' 44 of the substantial connection test itself creates
134. See Brehm I, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30,
2011) (discussing contractor's job as a travel supervisor who also processed incoming
and outgoing civilian employees). Viewed in a formalistic context, Brehm's contacts
could be considered very attenuated. See id.
135. See Ali , 71 M.J. 256, 267-68 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
136. See id. (stressing Ali's lack of prolonged presence within the United States).
137. See id at 268 (stating that there is no law that "mandates granting a noncitizen
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when they have not 'come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country' (quoting United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990))); id. ("[T]he privilege of
litigation has been extended to aliens ... only because permitting their presence in the
country implied protection." (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78
(1950))).
138. See id. ("The offenses giving rise to the charges against Ali took place outside
the United States.").
139. See id. at 267-68.
140. Al II, 71 M.J. at 268.
141. See id. at 267-68 ("Those protections, however, are the result of the alien's
presence 'within the territory' of the United States." (quoting Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896))).
142. See id. at 267 ("[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country." (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990))
(alteration in original)).
143. See id. at 268 (applying the substantial connection test).
144. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (requiring that foreign nationals to
"come within the territory of the United States" to receive constitutional protections).
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concerns beyond the facts of Ali.145  As a result of this territorial
prerequisite, the extent of the analysis of a foreign national's connection
with the United States is likely limited to times in which he or she is
present within the technical borders of the United States.146 Indeed, had
Ali stayed in Fort Benning for a longer period of time, it seems likely
that he would have satisfied the substantial connection test under the
majority's reasoning. 147
Although the court briefly mentions Ali's overseas employment
within the context of the substantial connection test,148 its portrayal of his
occupation differed drastically from its description of his employment
earlier in the opinion. 49  In addressing the jurisdictional issue, 5 ° the
majority highlighted the importance of Ali's job in finding a basis for
jurisdiction. 5 The majority described Ali as "virtually indistinguishable
from the troops.. . and [that] he faced the same daily routines and
threats as [the military squad].' 52
While the majority extensively quoted trial court passages
describing the importance of Ali's position with regard to the
jurisdictional issue, 53 it devoted only one half-sentence to Ali's
employment in the context of its substantial connection analysis. 54 This
is concerning because it is the importance of Ali's position to U.S.
interests that highlights the full extent of Ali's connection with the
United States. 5 5  Given the territorial constraints of the substantial
145. See infra Part II.B.2.
146. See Ali 11, 71 M.J. at 268 (addressing Ali's employment within a half sentence).
But see Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The
Supreme Court has held in a series of cases that the border of the United States is not a
clear line that separates aliens who may bring constitutional challenges from those who
may not.").
147. See Ali II, 71 M.J. at 268 (describing the duration of defendant's visit to the
United States).
148. Id. ("[H]is employment with a United States corporation outside the United
States [does not] constitute[] a 'substantial connection' with the United States as
envisioned in Verdugo-Urquidez.").
149. Compare id. (phrasing Ali's occupation as "employment with a United States
corporation outside the United States"), with id. at 264 ("For operational purposes, Ali's
role as [an] interpreter was integral to the mission of I st Squad.").
150. See id. at 263-64 (considering whether Ali was "serving with" or
"accompanying an armed force").
151. See id.
152. Ali11, 71 M.J. at 264.
153. See id. at 263-64.
154. See id. at 268.
155. See id. at 264 ("As an interpreter, Ali would have been specifically targeted by
the enemy in an attempt to inhibit United States Army communications capabilities.").
[Vol. 118:1
SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
connection test, 156 however, the result was a situation where form
overcame substance. 157 In addition to the substantial connection issue,
the majority's cursory mention of Boumediene is also a concern.
158
The majority in Ali failed to give any meaningful consideration to
Boumediene's functional emphasis. 59 The majority only references
Boumediene in a single footnote that responds to a concurring opinion's
mention of Boumediene.'60 Although the Ali majority acknowledged that
a practical approach was necessary in the case, 16 1 it never mentioned the
Boumediene three-factor test. 62  Instead, the only reference to a
Boumediene factor was the court's mention of citizenship within the
footnote.1
63
While citizenship is a factor mentioned in both the sufficient nexus
and Boumediene tests,' 64 it is but one factor. Merely discussing
citizenship ignores the broader practical emphasis, as well as the other
factors, of Boumediene.165  As such, despite claiming to recognize the
importance of a practical analysis, the majority failed to give any
meaningful analysis within a practical framework. 1
66
Beyond the intricacies of Ali, the court's decision leaves questions
as to its applicability to Fifth and Sixth Amendment 167 protections otherthan the specific protections claimed by Ali,168 and also as to the
156. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (requiring
foreign nationals to "come within the territory of the United States" to receive
constitutional protections).
157. See Ali 1, 71 M.J. at 268 (finding that Ali's connections did not satisfy the
substantial connection test).
158. See id. at 269, n.25.
159. See generally id. at 258-71 (failing to discuss Boumediene other than in a brief
footnote).
160. Id. at 269, n.25.
161. Id. ("We agree that such a[] [practical] analysis is necessary in this case....
162. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (establishing a three-factor
test).
163. Ali 11, 71 M.J. at 269 n.25 (remarking "'[t]hat the petitioners in [Covert] were
American citizens was a key factor in the case and was central to the plurality's
conclusion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to American civilians tried outside
the United States."' (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 760 (2008))).
164. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (determining citizenship to be a relevant
factor); Brehm I, No. 1:11-CR-i1, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011)
(describing citizenship as a relevant factor in nexus cases).
165. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
166. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 25, at 29-30 (describing the
majority opinion in Ali as having failed to address all of the Boumediene factors).
167. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
168. See All II, 71 M.J. at 276 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (describing the specific
protections sought by Ali, including grand jury indictment, an independent judge, and
trial by jury).
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Although Ali's case was unique, 17' and its result was likely
correct, 17' the decision creates concerns as to whether future foreign
national contractors charged under the UCMJ can claim Fifth or Sixth
Amendment 172 protections beyond the specific protections sought by
Ali.173  Furthermore, although the substantial connection and
Boumediene tests may likely be reconciled within the civilian context,1
74
the territorial constraint of the substantial connection test, 175 along with
the practical hiring realities of foreign national military contractors,
76
prevents any meaningful analysis of a foreign national's connection with
the United States and makes reconciliation unlikely within the military
context.1
77
1. Constitutional Protections Not Altered by the Military Context
The Ali decision may prevent future foreign national defendants
charged under the UCMJ from asserting non-UCMJ protections 78 that
169. See infra Part III.B.2.
170. See Ali I1, 71 M.J. at 279-80 (Effron, J., concurring) (describing the uniqueness
of Ali's case given his status as a host-country national who was ineligible to be tried
under the MEJA).
171. See id. at 277 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's analysis
that Ali's "Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by his court-martial, but
through a distinct and narrower analysis"). The result was likely correct because even
U.S. military personnel tried under the UCMJ are not entitled to the specific
constitutional protections sought by Ali. See id. at 271 ("What [Ali] was not entitled to
were rights extending beyond those provided to members of the Armed Forces as a
matter of constitutional law.").
172. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
173. See infra Part III.B.1.
174. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012)
(applying the substantial connection test and the Boumediene functional approach to a
case involving a foreign national on a student visa).
175. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (requiring that
foreign nationals "come within the territory of the United States" to receive constitutional
protections).
176. See infra Part III.B.2.
177. See infra Part III.B.2.
178. Within this section, the author uses the term "non-UCMJ protections" to refer to
constitutional protections derived from the Constitution and not from specific UCMJ
articles.
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are unaltered by the context of a military trial. 179 While similar, many
UCMJ protections180 are not identical to non-UCMJ protections. 1
The Ali court's broad statement that it is "unwilling to extend
constitutional protections granted by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
a non-citizen"'82 who has not satisfied the substantial connection test has
been criticized as unnecessarily broad. 83 Viewed in this manner, there is
a concern that the Ali case will prohibit future foreign national
defendants tried under the UCMJ from asserting any Fifth or Sixth
Amendment non-UCMJ protections unless they are physically within the
United States or meet the substantial connection test.
184
As a result of its overly broad conclusion, the Ali court may have
unnecessarily closed off non-UCMJ protections, such as a void for
vagueness claim, 185 which have no counterparts within the UCMJ.
186
While many UCMJ protections have comparable counterparts to non-
UCMJ protections, 187 a void for vagueness claim has no comparable
179. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 58 M.J. 466, 468-69 (C.A.A.F. 2003)
(analyzing whether an order given to a service member was unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the service member's Fifth Amendment due process rights).
180. Within this section, the author uses the term "UCMJ protections" to refer to due
process protections that are specifically listed within the UCMJ.
181. See United States v. Jones, 61 M.J. 80, 83 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (noting that "an
appellant's constitutional due process right to a speedy post-trial review, [is] a right
separate and distinct from the [the UCMJ-based] 'sentence appropriateness' review
under Article 66"); John F. O'Connor, Contractors and Courts-Martial, 77 TENN. L. REV.
751, 751-52 (2010) (discussing the scope by which courts-martial have fewer protections
than civilian trials).
182. AlIiH, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
183. See id. at 276-77 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's opinion as
"relying on an expansive theory"); id. at 279 (Effron, J., concurring) (criticizing the
majority's opinion as affirming "on grounds broader than necessary for the resolution of
[the] case").
184. See id at 277 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's result, but
on different and narrower grounds).
185. See Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.") (citations omitted).
186. See Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006 &
Supp. V 2012). The author credits Captain Chad M. Fisher for giving him the idea to
utilize a void for vagueness claim. Email from Chad M. Fisher, U.S. Army Judge
Advocate, Gov't Appellate Div., to author (Sept. 21, 2012, 9:52 EST) (on file with
author).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Burrell, 13 M.J. 437, 440 (C.A.A.F. 1982) (addressing
the distinction between the UCMJ speedy trial provision and the Sixth Amendment
speedy trial provision).
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counterpart and derives its authority directly from the Fifth
Amendment.'88
Furthermore, unlike the specific non-UCMJ protections sought by
Ali,'89 which are not granted to any persons tried under the UCMJ, 19° a
military trial does not prevent a defendant from asserting a void for
vagueness claim.191 Therefore, the court may have unnecessarily closed
off constitutional protections with no UCMJ equivalents and which are
distinguishable from the specific protections claimed by Ali. 192  In
addition to Ali's possible future effect on non-UCMJ protections,
reconciling the substantial connection test with Boumediene within the
military context is also problematic. 
193
2. Searching for Boumediene
The hiring methods of many foreign national military contractors
1 94
raise concerns not present within the civilian context; namely, a
substantial number of foreign national military contractors are not (and
likely will never be) physically located within the United States for a
significant amount of time.1 95 Although Ibrahim represents the first case
to combine the substantial connection test with Boumediene's practical
emphasis,196 it is distinguishable by the fact that alien residents on
188. See United States v. Moore, 58 M.J. 466, 469 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (analyzing
whether an order given to a service member was unconstitutionally vague in violation of
the service member's Fifth Amendment due process rights).
189. See Ali 11, 71 M.J. 256, 276 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Baker, C.J., concurring)
(describing the specific protections sought by Ali, including grand jury indictment, an
independent judge, and trial by jury).
190. See id. at 271 (Baker, C.J., concurring) ("What [Ali] was not entitled to were
rights extending beyond those provided to members of the Armed Forces as a matter of
constitutional law.").
191. See, e.g., United States v. Pope, 63 M.J. 68, 73 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (discussing a
service member's challenge that an Air Force regulation violated his due process rights
because it was unconstitutionally vague).
192. See Ali 11, 71 M.J. at 268 (phrasing its finding as a blanket prohibition against
allowing foreign nationals that do not meet the substantial connection test from asserting
any Fifth or Sixth Amendment claims).
193. See infra Part III.B.2.
194. See Sarah Stillman, The Invisible Army, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2011),
http://nyr.kr/mSc5EU (discussing the common practice by which many foreign national
contractors are often hired from within third-world countries).
195. Compare Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2012)
(involving a foreign national on a student visa who had resided within the United States
for four years while attending school), with Brehm I, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL
1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (observing that Brehm had never stepped foot
within the United States before his trial).
196. See Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 997 (applying both the Boumediene functional
approach and the substantial connection test to analyze a foreign national defendant's
First and Fifth Amendment claims).
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student visas are purposefully located within the territorial boundaries of
the United States due to their attendance at American schools.197 Indeed,
the Ibrahim court used the fact that the student attended Stanford for four
years as the basis for why she satisfied the substantial connection test. 198
Unlike foreign nationals on student visas, the majority of foreign
nationals that serve with or accompany U.S. Armed Forces never step
foot within the United States. 1
99
The territorial presence requirement200 of the substantial connection
test is an issue because the modem-day hiring practices of foreign
national military contractors involve hiring many of these workers
directly from foreign countries.20  Thus, the likelihood that these
workers will ever step foot in the territorial confines of the United States
to satisfy the substantial connection test is unlikely.202 Additionally, a
substantial number 2 3 of these workers are host-country nationals.2°
This is relevant because host-country nationals are not eligible to be tried
under the MEJA 20 5 and therefore, like Ali, would be tried under the
UCMJ.
206
Even the few foreign nationals who are lucky enough to come
within the United States are still unlikely to satisfy the territorial
requirement of the substantial connection test.20 7 Similar to the trip taken
by Ali, these visits usually occur only to conduct pre-deployment
training for a short period of time.208  Given the territorial focus of
197. See, e.g., id. at 986 (describing the foreign national student who attended
Stanford for four years).
198. Id. at 997.
199. See, e.g., Brehm I, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30,
2011) (noting that prior to his trial, Brehm had never been within the United States).
200. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (requiring that
foreign nationals "come within the territory of the United States" to receive constitutional
protections).
201. See Stillman, supra note 194 (discussing the common practice by which
American companies sub-contract military support contracts to recruitment agencies
located in third-world nations and also noting that over 70,000 third-country nationals
work on behalf of U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan).
202. See, e.g., Brehm I, No. 1:1 -CR-1 1,2011 WL 1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30,
2011) (noting that prior to his trial, Brehm had never been within the United States).
203. See David Isenberg, Contactors in War Zones: Not Exactly "Contracting, " TIME
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://ti.meVVpHzP (remarking that out of the approximately 137,000
contractors working within U.S. Central Command, 50,560 were host-country nationals).
204. The author uses the term "host-country nationals" to refer to foreign national
military contractors who are citizens of the nation in which they are employed. For
example, Ali was an Iraqi citizen who was employed in Iraq while supporting U.S.
Armed Forces as an interpreter. Al II, 71 M.J. 256, 259 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(C) (2006).
206. AliI1, 71 M.J. at 258.
207. See, e.g., id. at 268 (finding that Ali did not satisfy the substantial connection test
despite his trip to the United States).
208. Id. (referencing Ali's "brief predeployment training at Fort Benning, Georgia").
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Verdugo-Urquidez, this brief amount of time is unlikely to qualify as a
substantial connection. 0 9
Therefore, despite the significant contributions many foreign
national military contractors have made for the benefit of the United
States, 2 ' a rigid application of the substantial connection test prevents
any meaningful consideration of the full scope of these acts.21' This
dominance of formalism over practicality directly frustrates the
functional approach rationale of Boumediene.212  Thus, the Ibrahim
court's hybrid approach may not be a workable solution within the
military context.
213
Given the interaction and similar purposes of the jurisdictional
sufficient nexus factors as related to the substantial connection and
Boumediene constitutional protections tests, a consideration of sufficient
nexus factors, in addition to the Boumediene factors, could serve as a
suitable proxy for the substantial connection test in light of the problems
that the substantial connection test poses within the military context.
214
C. Intersection Between the Sufficient Nexus, Substantial Connection,
and Boumediene Tests
While jurisdiction is distinct from whether a foreign national is
entitled to other constitutional protections,25 an analysis of both issues
highlights the close fluidity between the two frameworks.2 6 Much like
209. Id. (declining to grant constitutional protections to Ali in light of his brief
presence within the United States).
210. See Jesse Ellison, As War Nears An End, Our Afghan Translators Are Being Left
Behind, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 21, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://thebea.st/RM5EQp (describing an
incident where a host-country national combat interpreter was injured from "shrapnel
from a rocket-propelled grenade" while serving on a mission with U.S. Armed Forces).
211. See Al II, 71 M.J. at 268 (addressing Ali's employment in one-half sentence).
212. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (recognizing that the
"common thread" between the Court's precedent is "the idea that questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism").
213. Compare Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2012)
(involving a foreign national on a student visa who had resided within the United States
for four years while attending school), with Brehm I, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL
1226088, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011) (observing that Brehm had never stepped foot
within the United States before his trial).
214. See infra Part III.D.
215. Compare Brehm II, 691 F.3d 547, 549 (4th Cir. 2012) (addressing whether the
application of the statute, as applied to Brehm, violated due process concerns), with
Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 986 (addressing whether a student foreign national could assert First
and Fifth Amendment rights).
216. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754-55 (disregarding the technical formalities of
de jure sovereignty in place of a practical analysis); Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 997
(disregarding the government's argument by which "any alien, no matter how great her
voluntary connection with the United States, immediately loses all constitutional rights as
soon as she voluntarily leaves the country"); Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 552-53 (disregarding
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the connection concern in Verdugo-Urquidez, the sufficient nexus test
emphasizes the relationship between the foreign national and the United
States.217 Additionally, despite the territorial emphasis of Verdugo-
Urquidez,2"8 the sufficient nexus and substantial connection tests share a
common thread that unites them: fairness. 219 The sufficient nexus test is
predominantly concerned with ensuring that the application of the
extraterritorial statute to the defendant is not random or unfair.22°
Similarly, the substantial connection test "was an elaboration of its
earlier language in Johnson v. Eisentrager... [which stated] that an
alien 'is accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he
increases his identity with our society.' ' 221  Viewed in this context, a
broader rationale uniting both frameworks is that the more substantial an
alien's connection becomes with the United States, the fairer it is that the
alien is entitled to constitutional protections and subjected to
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Likewise, there is significant interplay between the sufficient nexus
and Boumediene tests. 2  In applying the sufficient nexus test, the Brehm
court did not allow the territorial formalities of the military base to be
dispositive of whether the application of the statute satisfied due
process.223  Similarly, Boumediene did not allow the territorial
formalities of Guantanamo to be dispositive of whether the detainees
could assert constitutional protections.224
Given the difficulty in reconciling Boumediene and Verdugo-
Urquidez within the military context, a test that applies the sufficient
the territorial formalities of the military base in favor of a practical method to analyze the
scope of defendant's connection with the United States).
217. Compare United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the connection between the defendant and the United States), with United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S 259, 271 (1990) (focusing on whether the
defendant voluntarily established a substantial connection with the United States).
218. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (requiring that foreign nationals "come
within the territory of the United States" to receive constitutional protections).
219. See id. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the concept of the mutuality
principal as it relates between jurisdictional and "certain correlative rights").
220. Davis, 905 F.2d at 249.
221. Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 995 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269).
222. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (listing factors to
consider, including citizenship, status, location, and practicality of resolving the issue),
with Brehm I, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011)
(describing relevant factors from prior nexus cases as involving citizenship, residency,
location of the offense, effect of the defendant's conduct on the U.S., employment with a
U.S. agency, and the "impact on significant [U.S.] interests.").
223. See Brehm 11, 691 F.3d 547, 553 (4th Cir. 2012).
224. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754.
225. See supra Part III.B.2.
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nexus factors of employment and significant interests impacted,22 6 in
addition to the Boumediene three-factor test,227 should be adopted when
addressing whether a foreign national tried under the UCMJ is entitled to
constitutional protections.
D. A Practical Proposal
An analysis that considers the sufficient nexus factors of
employment and significant American interests impacted by a foreign
national contractor's actions would serve as a "suitable proxy ' 228 for the
substantial connection test because the two factors would retain the
connection-centric emphasis of Verdugo-Urquidez,229  while also
allowing for a meaningful analysis of the connection within a military
230context. Moreover, language in Boumediene specifically allows for
other factors to be considered in addition to those included in its three-
factor test.
23'
1. Scope of Employment
A scope of employment factor could better account for the practical
connection that a foreign national serving with or accompanying U.S.
Armed Forces has with the United States.232 Employment has previously
been used as a relevant factor within the sufficient nexus context.233
Furthermore, the practical emphasis of Boumediene would allow courts
to weigh the extent to which some occupations establish a greater
connection than others.234 A job that is deemed essential to the
functioning of an American military, aid, or state organization may be
determined to establish a greater connection with the United States than a
job that is not considered as vital.235
226. See Brehm I, 2011 WL 1226088, at *4 (describing relevant nexus factors such as
employment and the "impact on significant [American] interests").
227. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (establishing a three-factor test)-
228. Brehm 11, 691 F.3d at 553.
229. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) ("[A]liens receive
constitutional protections when they have... developed substantial connections with this
country.").
230. See supra Part III.B.2.
231. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (stating that "at least three factors are
relevant") (emphasis added).
232. See Ali I1, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (C.A.A.F. 2012) ("Ali's role as [an] interpreter was
integral to the mission of [the military] squad.").
233. See United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp. 2d 832, 842 (E.D. Va. 2011).
234. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 ("[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on
objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.").
235. See Ali 1, 70 M.J. 514, 518 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (stating that Ali's "presence
as an interpreter was essential to the ability of the unit to accomplish its primary mission
of training and advising the Iraqi police").
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2. Significant American Interests Impacted
Addressing whether the subject matter at hand impacts significant
American interests would serve as an effective factor to ensure that the
connection is of a "substantial" nature,236 rather than being of a merely
"sufficient" manner. 23' Additionally, similar to its application in Brehm,
the factor would also serve as an effective tool to allow courts to look




While trying foreign national defendants under the UCMJ is rare,
the Ali decision raises broader concerns about the impact that the
application of the substantial connection test may have for future foreign
national defendants,2 40 as well as its impact on constitutional protections
not affected by the context of a military trial.241 In light of the realities of
how many of these foreign nationals come to be employed,242 the
substantial connection test, as applied within the military context, serves
as a barrier that allows technicalities to dominate the practical emphasis
of Boumediene.
243
Foreign nationals serving with or accompanying U.S. Armed Forces
deserve a full analysis of the significant contributions that many of them
make for the benefit of the United States.244  As Chief Judge Baker
noted, "[S]ervice with the Armed Forces of the United States in the
236. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (addressing
whether a foreign national has developed a substantial connection with the United
States).
237. United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1990).
238. See Brehm 11, 691 F.3d 547, 552-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (addressing the
pervasiveness of "the American influence" in place of territorial formalities).
239. See Al II, 71 M.J. 256, 280 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Effron, J., concurring) (describing
the uniqueness of Ali's case given his status as a host-country national who was ineligible
to be tried under the MEJA).
240. See id. at 268 (majority opinion) (addressing Ali's employment within a half
sentence despite the majority's earlier detailed description of Ali's vital importance to
U.S. military interests).
241. See id at 276 (Baker, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the majority as "relying on an
expansive theory"); id. at 279 (Effron, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's opinion
for affirming "on grounds broader than necessary for the resolution of [the] case").
242. See Stillman, supra note 194 (discussing the common practice by which many
foreign national contractors are often hired from within third-world countries).
243. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) ("[T]he idea [is] that
questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism."), with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S 259, 271 (1990)
(requiring aliens to come within the formal borders of the United States to receive
constitutional protections).
244. See Ellison, supra note 210.
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uniform of the United States in sustained combat is a rather substantial
connection to the United States. 245
245. Ali1H, 71 M.J. at 278 (Baker, C.J., concurring).
